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Abstract
Nonterritorial autonomy (nta) decouples governance of ‘people’ and ‘place’, 
allowing demographically submerged minorities to protect their cultural – but 
not territorial – interests. Indigenous peoples are often submerged and culturally 
vulnerable. At the same time, they are often especially interested in protecting 
the territories that have long sustained them. So, is nta well-suited or ill-suited 
for Indigenous self-governance? To explore this, we study Norwegian Sami self-
governance, an oft-cited case of Indigenous nta. We make several contributions. We 
enumerate the variety of Sami-specific rights and powers in Norway, categorising 
them as either territorial or nonterritorial and tracking their evolution over time. 
By doing this we reveal that Sami self-governance has recently taken a ‘territorial 
turn’. We explore why this has happened, concluding it is due to the insufficiency of 
nta. Finally, we discuss likely limits to further Sami territorialisation.
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Four decades ago, Western Europe’s sole Indigenous people set out to retake 
control of their culture and homeland. During the unprecedented Alta 
Conflict, the Sami of Norway protested generations of assimilation, marginal-
isation, and misuse of their traditional territories. They called for an array of 
rights and reforms. Some of these were quickly granted, including the estab-
lishment of a Sami assembly and powers protecting the Sami language, herit-
age and economic development. These victories were rightly celebrated. Sami 
had succeeded in winning back some control of their culture.
But what about control of their homeland? The powers ceded to Norway’s 
Sami in the aftermath of the Alta Conflict were not territorial. This was due, 
in no small part, to Norwegian ethnogeography – to the fact that, after centu-
ries of colonisation and intermixing, there was almost nowhere in Norway that 
Sami formed a local majority. Hence the Sami were seen as poorly suited to 
exercise authority over territory. However, they were felt to be well-suited for 
an intriguing alternative – ‘nonterritorial autonomy’, or nta.
Employed by the Ottomans to empower disparate religious groups, pro-
moted by political thinkers to avert intercultural bloodshed in the lead-up to 
World War One, and now increasingly used in a variety of multi-ethnic states, 
nta aims to provide governing authority to minorities who are thoroughly 
intertwined with competing peoples. NTA’s genius is seen to lie in decou-
pling the politics of ‘people’ and ‘place’. And indeed, the application of nta 
to Norway’s Sami has been cited as evidence of this genius. Even more so, 
Norwegian Sami governance has been cheered as an exemplar of Indigenous 
nta, seemingly displaying that Indigenous peoples – being highly culturally 
vulnerable, dispossessed of land, and numerically overwhelmed – are espe-
cially well-suited for nta.
Other scholars, however, have warned of the shortcomings of nta, espe-
cially for Indigenous peoples. The problem, as they see it, is that nta fails on 
the very account that distinguishes Indigenous peoples from other, non-Indig-
enous minorities. These critics maintain that nta, by its very nature, does not 
help Indigenous peoples protect their native environments – the sacrosanct 
landscapes, waterways, and natural resources that have sustained them for 
eons.
Who is right? Is nta well- or ill-suited for Indigenous self-determination? 
In this article we explore what the Norwegian Sami case can tell us about this 
question. In doing so, we make several contributions. We enumerate for the 
first time the variety of Sami-specific rights and powers exercised in Norway, 
categorising them as territorial or nonterritorial and tracking their evolution 
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over time. By doing this, we reveal that Sami self-determination in Norway, 
despite being lauded as an exemplar of Indigenous nta, has in fact taken what 
we call a ‘territorial turn’. This turn involves not the creation of a singular Sami 
territory but rather the institution of a patchwork of Sami rights, powers and 
authorities over land and natural resources. We explore why this has happened, 
what it says about the (in)sufficiency of Indigenous nta, and the prospects for 
further Sami territorialisation.
We proceed thusly: in the next section we discuss the theory of nta, its 
provenance, and the debate concerning its application to Indigenous chal-
lenges. We then provide a background on Norway’s Sami, tracing their political 
history from pre-contact times until the Alta Conflict. We go on to explore how 
the (non)territorial dimension of Sami authority has changed over the past 30 
years. Finally, we analyse and conclude.
2 Theory
Around the world, countless peoples strive to self-govern, not just over their 
collective affairs but over the places they hold dear. As such, they strive for 
territorial authority.
Territorial authority is almost inherently zero-sum. To the degree that one 
group exercises territorial authority, such authority is correspondingly dimin-
ished for all other groups. For the purposes of this paper we understand ter-
ritorial authority to refer to any one of three sorts of powers.1 First, territorial 
authority can mean jurisdiction – i.e., law-making and law-enforcement power 
over all residents of a given territory. Second, territorial authority can mean 
collective ownership and/or management of land and resources – land-use 
planning, development permitting, environmental protection and so forth. 
Third, territorial authority can mean the power to selectively regulate access, 
whether geographic (i.e. border control) or access to territorial resources. In 
any given geographic area these three sorts of territorial powers need not nec-
essarily coincide, nor be exercised by a single authority. Where they do – where 
a people govern their own state, or province, or autonomous zone – they pos-
sess a comprehensive territorial regime.
The aspiration of peoples to exercise territorial authority – and, certainly, to 
possess a comprehensive territorial regime – is made vexing by a simple fact. 
There are too few places to go around. We live, as Nimni observes, “in a world 
1 A. Stilz, ‘Nations, states, and territory’, 121:3 Ethics (2011) pp. 572–601; M. Moore, A Political 
Theory of Territory (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) p. 4.
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crowded by states”.2 At last count there were nearly 200 states, claiming, and 
often clashing over, all habitable lands on Earth. Left wanting are thousands of 
minority communities who demand self-determination but lack the option of 
statehood.
This surfeit of political aspirants and shortage of territory creates a chal-
lenge that political thinkers have long struggled to resolve. Certain solutions, 
which address the problem from the demand side, have rightly fallen out of 
favour. Genocide, mass deportation, and forced assimilation all reduce ter-
ritorial claims by eliminating claimants. Liberal democracy seeks to reduce 
claimants in a different way, by shifting focus from groups to individuals. 
Meanwhile, other solutions tackle the supply side, manipulating geopolitical 
space to better accommodate minorities. After the First World War, European 
borders were redrawn so states and nations would better match up. Where 
demography and politics allow it, internal borders too may be redrawn, provid-
ing federal or other ‘compound’ governance arrangements to ‘nations within’.3
But in many cases, demography and politics don’t allow borders to be 
redrawn. In some places, minorities are too intertwined with majorities (or 
with other minorities) to feasibly rule a space of their own. Or, claimants may 
prize the same place for contrary purposes, as when hostile faiths battle for 
Jerusalem, or when industrialists, farmers and hunter-gatherers champion 
incompatible uses of the commons. And of course, certain minorities were 
long ago converted into diasporas, with little chance of returning home. In all 
these cases, self-government requires creative solutions. One such solution is 
to decouple people and territory. Thus comes the innovation of nonterritorial 
autonomy (nta).
2.1 Non-territorial Autonomy
nta is an ‘umbrella term’4 associated with various political arrangements that 
aim to avoid the challenges posed by ‘blood and soil’ ethnonationalism by dis-
sociating blood from soil. nta does so by facilitating minority self-government 
absent geographic authority. Under nta, internal minorities exercise respon-
sibility not over a place but directly over their cultural members, irrespective 
of where they live. In this way, nta is ‘corporate’, or ‘personal’, rather than 
2 E. Nimni, ‘The conceptual challenge of non-territorial autonomy’, in E. Nimni, A. Osipov 
and D. J. Smith (eds.), The Challenge of Non-territorial Autonomy: Theory and Practice (Peter 
Land, Oxford, 2013) p. 13.
3 W. Kymlicka, ‘National cultural autonomy and international minority rights norms’, 6:3 
Ethnopolitics (2007) pp. 379–393.
4 F. Prina, ‘Nonterritorial Autonomy and Minority (Dis) Empowerment: Past, Present, and 
Future’, Nationalities Papers (2020) p. 2.
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territorial. It aspires to facilitate minority self-government without offending 
the territorial interests of competing collective peoples.
Of course, nta is seldom touted as a thoroughgoing political solution. It 
is not intended to provide exhaustive, state-like authority. Rather, it is a way 
to govern certain functional domains.5 Those domains cannot be territorial – 
they cannot be place-based, nor related to finite physical resources. To put it 
another way, they cannot be zero-sum. This eliminates authority over lands, 
mining, fish and wildlife, infrastructure, and energy. Also eliminated are inher-
ently state-level portfolios: defence, border-control, foreign policy, monetary 
policy, and so forth. Still, this leaves to nta a wealth of potential responsibil-
ities. De Villiers enumerates several: “education; promotion of language; cul-
ture; art, music and literature; historic and festival days; museums; symbols 
and insignia; place names; sport and recreation; … and media”.6 To these one 
might add health, welfare, economic development, family law, customary law, 
and religion.
nta has a long and respected pedigree. Historically the most famous nta 
arrangement was the Ottoman Empire’s Millet System, under which Jews and 
Christians, along with the Muslim majority, governed their respective cultural 
communities in keeping with their religious doctrines.7 Later, another variety 
of nta, ‘national personal autonomy’, was famously championed by Austrian 
political scientists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer as a tool for the Hapsburg 
Empire to quell infighting among its intermixed cultural communities.8 Renner 
and Bauer proposed that the sort of governance typically exercised by nation-
states could be exercised by cultural nations alone. Citizenship in a cultural 
nation would be analogous to membership in a religious denomination – “a 
personal association of those sharing a way of thinking and speaking”.9 As with 
“separation of church and state”, nation and state would be rigorously distinct.
While Renner and Bauer’s “Austrian solution”10 was never implemented, 
other versions of nta have more recently come to fruition, in places as diverse 
5 J. Coakley, ‘Introduction: Dispersed minorities and non-territorial autonomy’, 15:1 
Ethnopolitics (2016) pp. 1–23.
6 B. de Villiers, ‘Self-Determination for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people: Is the 
answer outside the territorial square?’, 16 University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review 
(2014) p. 103.
7 K. Barkley and G. Gavrilis, ‘The Ottoman Millet System: Non-territorial autonomy and its 
contemporary legacy’, 15:1 Ethnopolitics (2016) pp. 24–42.
8 Coakley, supra note 5.
9 K. Renner, ‘State and nation’, in E. Nimni (ed.), National-Cultural Autonomy and its 
Contemporary Critics (Routledge, London, 2004) p. 30.
10 T. Nieguth, ‘An Austrian solution for Canada? Problems and possibilities of national 
cultural autonomy’, 42:1 Canadian Journal of Political Science (2009) pp. 1–16.
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as Canada,11 numerous Central and Eastern European states,12 and, perhaps 
most famously, in Belgium’s bicultural Brussels-Capital region.13 Also, as 
we will now show, nta has been championed by some as a pathway for the 
self-determination of one of the most common, and vexingly situated, internal 
minorities, Indigenous peoples.
2.2 Minority Nations and Indigenous Peoples
Will Kymlicka, in his pathbreaking Multicultural Citizenship,14 suggests the 
world’s numerous “minority nations” can be divided into two classes. One 
class are Indigenous peoples. Having long been incorporated into, and margin-
alised by, dominant states, Indigenous peoples around the world now press for 
self-determination – for authority over matters key to their cultural survival, 
including language, spirituality, customary law, land and resources. In this way, 
Indigenous peoples are not unlike Kymlicka’s second class of minority nations, 
which he calls “stateless nations”. These include Quebecois, Åland Islanders, 
Catalans, Kurds, and so forth. Like Indigenous peoples, these nations lack 
states of their own, instead existing as sub-state peoples, often with a history 
and/or ongoing experience of cultural oppression and political domination at 
the hands of the majority.
Given the similarities between Indigenous peoples and other minority 
nations, it is no wonder their paths toward self-determination can also appear 
similar. In the spirit of the decolonised peoples of Africa and South Asia, 
Indigenous peoples may occasionally seek statehood – a goal that appears 
promising for the Inuit of Greenland. Or, like Åland Islanders, Indigenous peo-
ples may be granted de facto control of purpose-built subunits – for example, 
Canada’s Nunavut Territory. Another option may be power sharing, exercised in 
various ways. Like with the minority Serb and Italian communities in Croatia, 
the Maori of New Zealand enjoy a fixed share of seats in parliament. And, as 
with the various minority ethno-religious communities in Lebanon, Indigenous 
Fijians for a time exercised shared rule through consociationalism.15
11 S. Chouinard, ‘The rise of non-territorial autonomy in Canada: Towards a doctrine of 
institutional completeness in the domain of minority language rights’, 13:2 Ethnopolitics 
(2013) pp. 141–158.
12 B. Dobos, ‘The elections to nonterritorial autonomies of Central and South Eastern Europe,’ 
Nationalities Papers (2019) pp. 1–18.
13 Coakley, supra note 5.
14 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1995).
15 M. Bogaards, ‘Consociationalism and centripetalism: Friends or foes?’, 25:4 Swiss Political 
Science Review (2019) pp. 519–537.
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And yet, for all their similarities, Indigenous peoples clearly differ from 
other minority nations. For the purposes of this article, at least four differ-
ences are salient. The first has to do with their respective demographic posi-
tions. Unlike, for example, Quebecois, who comprise a decisive majority of 
the population in their homeland, almost all Indigenous peoples have been 
expelled from, or overwhelmed within, their traditional territories. Only in 
remote regions, such as the Arctic and Amazon, do Indigenous peoples still 
numerically dominate.
A second difference of Indigenous people concerns how they became 
minorities in the first place. Minority nations like the Quebecois were annexed 
for economic or strategic motives – because exogenous regimes benefitted 
from controlling the minority’s region, wealth, or population. Often these ben-
efits have faded with time. Indigenous peoples, however, were absorbed for a 
more enduring reason – settler-colonialism. As famously theorised by Wolfe, 
settler-colonialism is driven by the land-hunger of settlers.16 These settlers 
invade Indigenous territories, dispossess the inhabitants, sink their own roots 
in the soil, and nurture new versions of the European motherland. As Wolfe 
states, “settler colonizers come to stay”.17 Occupying Indigenous land is the 
whole point of their project.
Having been both overwhelmed and dispossessed, Indigenous peoples find 
themselves differently situated than other minority nations in a third way. 
They are especially culturally vulnerable. Whereas Quebec, for instance, enjoys 
a robust Francophone culture, most Indigenous cultures are in peril. Settlers 
discouraged or prohibited many Indigenous traditions, such as potlatches, 
shamanism, and drum-dancing. Indigenous lifeways and languages were 
repressed. For example, today in Canada only 17 per cent of Indigenous people 
can converse in their mother tongue.18 At least 10 of Canada’s Indigenous lan-
guages have gone extinct in the past century, and of the 70 that remain, all but 
three are endangered.19
16 P. Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism and the elimination of the native’, 8:4 Journal of Genocide 
Research (2006) pp. 387–409.
17 Ibid., p. 338.
18 T. McCarty, ‘Policy and politics of language revitalization in the USA and Canada,’ in S. 
Coronel-Molina and T. McCarty (eds.), Indigenous Language Revitalization in the Americas 
(Routledge, London, 2016).
19 O. McIvor and A. Anisman, ‘Keeping our languages alive: Strategies for Indigenous language 
revitalization and maintenance’, in Y. Watanabe (ed.), Handbook of Cultural Security (Elgar, 
London, 2018) p. 90.
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There is a final way Indigenous groups are unlike other minority nations. 
Kymlicka defines “stateless” minority nations as peoples who lost out in the 
battle for modern statehood20 – peoples who did, or do, have the desire and 
capacity to become Westphalian sovereigns. Quebec, Catalan, and Scotland, 
for example, have each contemplated joining the global family of states, with 
all that entails, including hard borders, territorial jurisdiction, and exclusive cit-
izenship. Contrarily, most Indigenous groups do not aspire to statehood. Often, 
their ambitions are for almost the opposite – for a revival of their pre-contact 
agency, values and traditions. These goals are non-Westphalian.
2.3 Indigenous Peoples and nta
For all four of the above reasons, Indigenous peoples, even more than other 
minority nations, may be good candidates for nta. As noted, Indigenous 
peoples, having been ‘swamped’ by settlers, seldom form the sort of regional 
majorities required for territorial solutions such as empowerment within fed-
eral subunits. Indigenous territorial authority is further stymied by settlers’ his-
toric and enduring attachment to land: for Indigenous peoples to regain their 
territory, settlers – who have quite literally grounded their economies and soci-
eties in that territory – would have to give it up. At the same time, many of the 
most pressing Indigenous issues relate to cultural and linguistic vulnerability, 
the precise functional domains best addressed by nta. Finally, as just noted, 
unlike ‘stateless’ minority nations, many Indigenous peoples do not desire any-
thing like Westphalian statehood.
Hence, certain thinkers have called for Indigenous peoples to be granted 
nta. According to de Villiers, “If ever there was a group for which a nonterri-
torial solution for self-determination is to be found it is Aboriginal people”.21 
Klímová-Alexander agrees: “I believe that nonterritorial autonomy, which 
allows for the enjoyment of cultural and economic rights over Indigenous 
territories, offers a better, more universally applicable and less conflict-prone 
solution for Indigenous peoples worldwide”.22 Nimni concurs: “The model pro-
posed by Renner and Bauer is well suited to minorities that demand significant 
autonomy but for a variety of reasons cannot have separate states. A prime 
example of such minorities is Indigenous peoples”.23
20 W. Kymlicka, ‘Theorizing Indigenous Rights’, 49:2 University of Toronto Law Journal (1999) p. 
282.
21 De Villiers, supra note 6, p. 94.
22 I. Klímová-Alexander, ‘Transnational Romani and indigenous non-territorial self-
determination claims’, 6:3 Ethnopolitics (2007) p. 397.
23 Nimni (ed.), supra note 9, p. 11.
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And indeed, nta is being experimented with in numerous Indigenous 
contexts. In Canada, nta is a common component of Indigenous self-govern-
ment regimes. For example, Nieguth notes that the Nisga’a Nation government 
“includes a significant extra-territorial element, as it extends … to members of 
the Nisga’a nation that reside outside the nation’s territory”.24 In New Zealand, 
nta is exercised by Urban Maori Authorities.25 In the ‘Plurinational State 
of Bolivia’, Indigenous nta is etched in the constitution.26 In Ethiopia, nta 
has been used in an attempt to empower Indigenous peoples in the region of 
Benishangul Gumuz.27 And in the most cited examples of Indigenous nta,28 
Europe’s Nordic countries have all established Sami assemblies.
Yet faith in Indigenous nta is not universal. This is for another reason seen 
to distinguish Indigenous peoples from others: their singular relationship to 
the land.29 While Renner defended nta by stating, “There is no necessary con-
nection between the consciousness of nationality and a particular territory”,30 
Indigenous peoples would likely disagree. So too would anthropologists such 
as Brody,31 who divide the world’s peoples into two dichotomous types. One 
type are agrarian-industrialists, who thrive by manipulating whatever environ-
ment they find themselves in. Their lifeways are portable and often land-hun-
gry; since the Agrarian Revolution, they have expanded to dominate the world. 
The other type of peoples are Indigenes, mostly rooted in hunter-gathering, 
24 Nieguth, supra note 10, p. 8.
25 P. Patton, ‘National autonomy and Indigenous sovereignty’, in Nimni (ed.), supra note 9; 
Coakley, supra note 5.
26 I. Radhuber, ‘Indigenous struggles for a plurinational state: An analysis of indigenous rights 
and competences in Bolivia’, 11:2 Journal of Latin American Geography (2012) p. 167; Nimni, 
supra note 2.
27 B. Dessalegn, ‘Experimenting with non-territorial autonomy: Indigenous councils in 
Ethiopia’, 18:2 Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2019) pp. 3–23.
28 See e.g., S. Tuulentie, ‘“Culture alone will not put bread on the table”. The many facets of the 
debate on the preservation of Sami culture’, 16:1 Acta Borealia (1999) pp. 97–115; M. Amarjeet 
Singh, ‘Ethnic diversity, autonomy, and territoriality in Northeast India: A case of tribal 
autonomy in Assam’, 32:6 Strategic Analysis (2008) pp. 1101–1114; B. de Villiers, ‘Protecting 
minorities on a non-territorial basis – recent international developments’, 3:4 Beijing Law 
Review (2012) pp. 170–183; E. Josefsen, U. Mörkenstam and J. Saglie, ‘Different Institutions 
within Similar States: The Norwegian and Swedish Sámediggis’, 14:1 Ethnopolitics (2015) 
pp. 32–51; T. Malloy, A. Osipov and B. Vizi (eds.), Managing Diversity through Non-territorial 
Autonomy: Assessing Advantages, Deficiencies, and Risks (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2015).
29 L. Betasamosake Simpson, ‘Land as pedagogy: Nishnaabeg intelligence and rebellious 
transformation’, 3:3 Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society (2014) pp. 1–25.
30 Renner, supra note 9, p. 25.
31 H. Brody, The Other Side of Eden: Hunter-Gatherers, Farmers, and the Shaping of the World 
(Douglas and McIntyre, Vancouver, 2001).
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whose well-being has hinged on adapting to their particular environment. 
Indigenous peoples were grounded, economically and cosmologically, in some 
specific place. Now they have almost no place left. Thus, for Indigenous peo-
ples, protecting their land and resources is paramount.
Hence, some scholars argue nta is distinctly insufficient for securing 
Indigenous self-rule. As Nieguth observes, “national cultural autonomy has lit-
tle to say on the nexus between land claims, national self-government, and col-
lective identity that underpins much of Aboriginal nationalism”.32 Kymlicka 
seems to agree, suggesting that in at least some cases Indigenous nta is being 
promoted not to fulfil but rather sidestep Indigenous territorial objectives.33 
Patton, commenting on Renner and Bauer’s model of nta, is similarly damn-
ing: “The experience of colonized Indigenous peoples suggests that control 
over land and resources is fundamental to their capacity to survive as autono-
mous nations within former colonial states”.34
Who is right? Are de Villiers, Klímová-Alexander and Nimni correct that 
nta arrangements are ideally suited for Indigenous circumstances? Or, con-
versely, are Nieguth, Kymlicka and Patton correct – is nta woefully inadequate 
for, or even a distraction from, Indigenous demands? In this paper we set out 
to explore that question by studying the case of Norway’s Sami people. Though 
Sami are also resident in Russia, Finland and Sweden, it is in Norway where 
they are most populous as well as most politically empowered. For three dec-
ades Norway’s Sami have exercised an increasing degree of authority by way of 
a Sami assembly, or Sámediggi, and have come to enjoy a host of Sami-specific 
rights. As noted, this authority, and these rights, are frequently cited as an 
exemplar of nta. We seek to discern the extent, trends, motives, and barriers 
to the use of nta by Norway’s Sami. We do this to determine whether, why, and 
how nta has facilitated Sami self-determination, and what this says about its 
utility for Indigenous peoples.
3 The Sami of Norway: A Background
Speakers of a Finno-Ugric language, the Sami have inhabited northern 
Fennoscandia since ancient times, living until recently as nomadic hunters, 
fishers, and reindeer herders. Beginning more than 500 years ago they were 
absorbed into southerly kingdoms, including the Danish-Norwegian kingdom, 
32 Nieguth, supra note 10, pp. 10–11.
33 Kymlicka, supra note 3, p. 390.
34 Patton, supra note 25, p. 115.
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through a protracted and largely non-violent process of cultural synthesis and 
colonisation. Sami joined coastal trade networks, adopted Norwegian agricul-
tural practices, were proselytised by Christian missionaries, and were taxed 
by foreign kings. As nomads they were denied property ownership;35 the wild 
lands used by Sami became “King’s ground”.36 Meanwhile, the Danish throne 
encouraged agrarian homesteading of Sami lands, both by Norwegian settlers 
and by Sami.37
When Norway became independent from Denmark in 1814, Sami were con-
sidered full citizens.38 Unlike in New World states such as the U.S. and Canada, 
in Norway there was no native legal status or tribal recognition.39 Sami were 
thus spared common settler-colonial injustices such as disenfranchisement 
and confinement on reserves. At the same time, Sami never got the opportu-
nity to sign treaties securing their political and territorial distinctiveness.40 For 
good or ill they were, by law, Norwegians.
In practice, however, Sami were treated as different. One way was to their 
advantage. In northern Norway, the practice of reindeer herding was (and 
remains) open only to Sami. The provenance of this right is unclear but is 
considered ‘ancient’.41 But in many other ways, Sami were disadvantaged. Due 
to perceptions of Sami genetic and cultural inferiority,42 the homogenising 
impulse of Norwegian nation-building, and humanitarian and religious desires 
to lift Sami from their ‘backwards and wretched’ state, Sami were subjected to 
the state policy of fornorsking, or Norwegianisation.
35 C. Allard, ‘The Nordic countries’ law on Sámi territorial rights’, 2:2 Arctic Review on Law and 
Politics (2011) pp. 159–183.
36 A. Sandberg, ‘Collective rights in a modernizing North – on institutionalizing Sami and 
local rights to land and water in northern Norway’, 2:2 International Journal of the Commons 
(2008) pp. 269–287
37 Sandberg, ibid.
38 G. Wilson and P. Selle, ‘Indigenous Self-Determination in Northern Canada and Norway’, 69 
IRPP Study (Institute for Research on Public Policy, Montreal, 2019).
39 An exception with symbolic, but no legal, significance is the 1751 Lapp Codicil, struck 
between the Danish/Norwegian and Swedish/Finnish kingdoms, addressing Sami trans-
border herding. See A. Sandberg, ‘Collective rights in a modernizing North,’ 2:2 International 
Journal of the Commons (2008) pp. 269–287.
40 C. Allard, ‘The rationale for the duty to consult Indigenous peoples: Comparative reflections 
from Nordic and Canadian legal contexts’, 9 Arctic Review on Law and Politics (2018) pp. 
25–43.
41 Sandberg, supra note 36.
42 Josefsen et al., supra note 28.
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Norwegianisation lasted from the 1870s until at least the Second World 
War.43 During this period, Sami cultural manifestations, such as traditional 
gákti clothing and joik singing, were discouraged. In much of Norway, settlers 
were permitted and even encouraged to expand into lands used by Sami. Sami 
were denied land-ownership unless they displayed fluency in, and active use 
of, Norwegian.44 Sami children were educated solely in Norwegian, some-
times in assimilative and abusive residential schools.45 In general, ethnic 
Norwegians looked down on Sami and were sometimes openly discriminatory. 
Unsurprisingly, the number of people admitting or even perceiving themselves 
to be Sami plunged.46 Likewise, especially in the coastal, or ‘outer’, north, use 
of the Sami language dramatically declined.47
After the Second World War, overt Norwegianisation ended – and yet, in 
some ways, Sami assimilation accelerated. Due to post-war rebuilding after the 
Nazi devastation of northern Norway, to advances in transportation and com-
munications, and to dramatic expansion of the Norwegian welfare state, Sami 
were ineluctably drawn into mainstream Norwegian society. Discriminatory 
treatment diminished, though did not disappear. Sami became, in effect, 
“Sami-speaking Norwegians”48 – they were seen as backward and strange, per-
haps, but deserving of basic equality. During the post-war period, Sami came 
to advance their distinct cultural concerns as one of scores of interest groups 
active in Norwegian civil society, using electoral and other channels to press 
for attention and funds from the state.
At the same time, Sami took their first cautious steps toward collective 
self-determination. In the late 1950s, a committee comprising Sami and state 
authorities proposed creating a distinct legal district in which the Sami lan-
guage would enjoy preferential treatment.49 The district would be in Finnmark, 
Norway’s northernmost and largest county, where Sami are most numerous. 
43 P. Selle, A. Semb, K. Strømsnes, and Å. Nordø, Den samiske medborgeren (Cappelen Damm 
Akademisk, Oslo, 2015).
44 A. Semb, ‘From “Norwegian citizens” via “citizens plus” to “dual political membership”’?, 
35:9 Ethnic and Racial Studies (2012) pp. 1654–1672.
45 H. Minde, ‘Assimilation of the Sami: Implementation and consequences’, 20:2 Acta Borealia 
(2003) pp. 121–146.
46 T. Falch, P. Selle and K. Strømsnes, ‘The Sámi: 25 Years of Indigenous Authority in Norway’, 
15:1 Ethnopolitics (2016) pp. 125–143.
47 E. Eyþórsson, Sjøsamene og kampen om fjordressursene (CálliidLágádus, Karasjok, 2008).
48 Falch et al., supra note 46.
49 I. Bjørklund, ‘Påskeresolusjonen i 1960 – Karasjoks etnopolitiske oppgjør’, 48:3 
Heimen – Lokal og regional historie (2011) pp. 195–206; A. Andresen, ‘Vitenskapene og 
den nye samepolitikken (1945–1963)’, 95:3 Historisk Tidsskrift (2016) pp. 405–435.
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However, political opponents, among them many Sami, feared this would 
establish a ‘Sami reservation’. The plan was never implemented. Nonetheless, 
in the 1970s Sami activists popularised the geographic concept of Sápmi, an 
area approximating the extent of historic Sami habitation. Though the bound-
aries of Sápmi were never formalised, most Sami maps depict it extending 
across much of Fennoscandia, including the northern two-thirds of Norway. 
There were other acts of nation-building, too: a Sami flag and national day were 
adopted, as was a Sami anthem, celebrating Sámieanan, the Sami homeland.50
At the end of the 1970s came a “critical juncture”,51 the so-called Alta 
Conflict.52 The conflict erupted when Norway announced plans to dam the 
Alta River in inner Finnmark, disrupting the salmon run, flooding reindeer 
pasturelands, and displacing the Sami village of Masi. Between 1979 and 1981, 
Sami, along with environmentalists, vigorously protested, conducting hun-
ger strikes, occupying the prime minister’s office, appealing to the European 
Commission of Human Rights,53 and blockading the dam construction site. 
At one point, 10 per cent of Norway’s police force was on guard in Finnmark.54 
The conflict was the most disruptive event of civil disobedience in modern 
Norway.55 Suddenly a substantial portion of Sami demanded not mere integra-
tion but accommodation as a distinct, rights-bearing Indigenous nation. They 
pressed to be not just included in Norwegian politics but to have a new space 
alongside it, where they could self-determine.
Norway, caught off guard by the Alta Conflict and fearing for its reputation 
as a champion of human rights, scrambled to accommodate certain of the Sami 
demands.56 In short order a Sami Rights Commission was empanelled, and by 
the end of the 1980s the foundational Sami protections were in place – the 
‘Sami clause’ of the Norwegian constitution, the signing of the International 
50 T. Falch and P. Selle, Sametinget – institusjonalisering av en ny samepolitikk (Gyldendal 
Akademisk, Oslo, 2018).
51 S. Lipset and S. Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives 
(Free Press, New York, 1967).
52 H. Eidheim, ‘Ethno-political development among the Sami after World War ii: The 
invention of selfhood’, in H. Gaski (ed.), Sami Culture in a New Era: The Norwegian Sami 
Experience (University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1997).
53 ECommHR case of G and E v. Norway (Eur.Comm.HR, 3 October 1983, 35 D&R 30).
54 A. Andersen and A. Midttun, ‘Conflict and local mobilization: the Alta hydropower project’, 
28:4 Acta Sociologica (1985) pp. 317–335.
55 K. Strømsnes and P. Selle, ‘Aksjoner i det representative demokrati’ in H. Narud, K. Heidar 
and T. Grønlie (eds.), Stortingets historie 1964–2014 (Fagbokforlaget, Bergen, 2014).
56 H. Vik, H. Hagtvedt and A. Semb, ‘Who owns the land? Norway, the Sami and the ilo 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention’, 20:4 International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights (2013) pp. 517–550; Josefsen et al., supra note 28.
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Labour Organization’s Convention on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples (ILO 169), and the Norwegian Parliament’s Sami Act. Flowing from 
these protections, Norway in 1987 established Europe’s first contemporary 
Indigenous political body, the Sámediggi, which became the core Sami insti-
tution both politically and symbolically. For Norway, a country with a politi-
cal tradition of unitary government and universal citizenship, and a history of 
Sami assimilation and discrimination, these were remarkable steps. They were 
not, however, steps toward Sami territorial authority.
Though the Alta Conflict had been about land and resources, pitting Sami 
land-use practices against the development goals of the state, accommodat-
ing Sami territorial interests was at the time considered unrealistic. This was 
due largely to ethnogeography. In most of Norway, Norwegians live side by 
side with Sami, and dramatically outnumber them. Sami today are numeri-
cally dominant only in inner Finnmark. There they form clear majorities in 
two municipal districts, Kautokeino and Karasjok, and bare- or near-majori-
ties in three more municipal districts, Tana, Nesseby and Porsanger. Moreover, 
because of extensive intermarriage, assimilation, and, at least in the past, 
suppression of Sami heritage, being Sami is seldom “a matter of either/or”.57 
Rather, many people think of themselves as part-Sami, or identify as Sami only 
at certain times or places, or, despite possessing clear Sami heritage, identify 
solely as Norwegian.
For all these reasons, despite Norway’s desire to appease Sami in the after-
math of the Alta Conflict, there seemed to be no clear, substantial territory over 
which Sami could be granted control. This was precisely the sort of challenge 
that inspired the advent of nta – the problem of multiple, clashing peoples 
occupying the same limited place. Hence, Sami were initially empowered in a 
way that decoupled people and place. In short order they became the world’s 
most prominent Indigenous group exercising nta.
4 Sami nta
In this section we discuss the establishment and scope of Norwegian Sami 
nta. This nta applies to a wide range of functional domains, including polit-
ical participation, language, economic development, and cultural-heritage 
management. These nta functional domains are all administered by the 
Sámediggi. None involve territorial powers – jurisdiction, land management, 
57 Semb, supra note 44.
10.1163/15718115-bja10009 | spitzer
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2020) 1-24Downloaded from Brill.com12/29/2020 09:36:36AM
via free access
15
or regulation of physical access. Put another way, Sami nta is not zero-sum: it 
does not intrude on the rights or powers of non-Sami.
Since the birth of the Sámediggi in 1987, key Sami democratic rights, such as 
political status, voting, and representation, have applied to all Norwegian Sami, 
whether they are reindeer herders in Kautokeino, surgeons in Hammerfest, or 
bureaucrats in Oslo. Sami political status is acquired by joining the Sami elec-
toral registry. To join the registry, a person must confirm two things – first, that 
one feels Sami, and second, that one speaks Sami or grew up with at least one 
Sami-speaking parent, grandparent or great-grandparent. When the registry 
was instituted in the late 1980s its enrolment was around 5,500. Today that 
number has grown to 18,000, most dwelling in the north but others hailing 
from every other corner of Norway.
Being enrolled in the Sami registry is a precondition for enjoying two other 
core Sami democratic rights, voting and representation. Only registered Sami 
can cast ballots in Sámediggi elections. The Sámediggi’s 39 representatives 
are chosen from seven electoral districts that together cover all of Norway. 
The Sámediggi is tasked under the Sami Act with representing Sami in all 
regions of Norway, and with dealing with all matters particularly affecting 
Sami.58 Originally its role was largely advisory, counselling and critiquing the 
Norwegian government on Sami-related matters. Over the years it has become 
more like a co-decider. Also, the Sámediggi was originally tasked with admin-
istrating Norwegian-government programs using earmarked funds. Now, the 
Sámediggi makes many of its own administrative and funding decisions, draw-
ing on an annual budget of around NOK 520 million (USD 57 million).
Second only to facilitating Sami political participation, the Sámediggi’s 
most important functional domain is promoting the Sami language. In 1992 
the Sami Language Act granted all Sami children the right be taught the Sami 
language in school. Moreover, where at least 10 Sami children request it, the 
Sami language must be made their general language of instruction in school.59 
Hence, even in Oslo there are schools that deliver the curriculum in the Sami 
language. Additional Sami language rights apply in what is called the Sami 
Language Administrative District,60 covering 12 municipalities with a large 
Sami population. In the district, Sami is an official state language on a par with 
Norwegian. All students there can choose either Sami or Norwegian as their 
general language of instruction. As well, in this district Sami have the right to 
interact with government agencies in the Sami language.
58 Wilson and Selle, supra note 38.
59 Falch et al., supra note 46.
60 Wilson and Selle, supra note 38, p. 36.
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A third important nta functional domain is Sami-oriented economic 
development, fostered through the Sámediggi’s business-incentive grant 
scheme. The scheme pre-dates the Alta Conflict, having been instituted by 
the Norwegian government in 1974. Today grants are available to applicants 
in 21 municipal districts and parts of 10 others. For certain grants, such as for 
practising doudji (Sami traditional crafts), applicants must meet the criteria for 
enrolment in the Sami electoral registry.61 For other grants even non-Sami may 
qualify, as long as their business is perceived to benefit Sami.
A fourth Sámediggi nta functional domain is cultural-heritage manage-
ment. This responsibility does not in practice extend throughout Norway, 
but instead is “limited to the territories in which the Sami currently practice 
reindeer husbandry and historically have exploited other resources”.62 As will 
be discussed later, these reindeer-herding territories cover approximately the 
northern 40 per cent of Norway.
In addition to these early applications of Sami nta, Norway in 2005 struck an 
agreement with the Sámediggi to consult Sami on all governmental decisions 
likely to affect them.63 On many matters, such as culture, language, education 
and spirituality, this consultation requirement applies to Sami everywhere in 
Norway.
4.1 Sami Territorial Authority
As shown above, Sami nta in Norway is extensive. For this reason, Sami author-
ity has been characterised as an exemplar of nta, showcasing how dissevering 
‘blood’ from ‘soil’ can satisfy the political ambitions of Indigenous peoples. We 
suggest, however, that it may be time to reconsider that characterisation. Sami 
territorial authority has in fact been on the rise. In a few instances, this new-
found territorial authority is exercised by the Sámediggi, but in most cases it is 
exercised by other de jure or de facto Sami entities.
As noted previously, territorial authority describes any one of three sorts 
of zero-sum powers – jurisdiction, land-use management, and regulation of 
access to land and resources. In the case of Norway’s Sami, the least common 
of these forms of territorial authority is the first, jurisdiction. In no region of 
Norway do Sami enjoy explicit legal jurisdiction. However, in certain cases 
Sami do wield de facto control. Such cases are limited to the few aforemen-
tioned Finnmark municipal districts where Sami form a local majority. In these 
districts, Sami, by dint of their numbers, democratically dominate the public 
61 Falch et al., supra note 46, p 133.
62 Falch et al., ibid.
63 Allard, supra note 40.
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municipal governments. Of course, the law-making and law-enforcement pow-
ers of these municipal governments are somewhat limited – not the extensive 
jurisdiction envisioned by most proponents of Indigenous self-rule.
A far more substantive Sami territorial power relates to selective access to 
lands and resources – in this case, the right of Sami to use certain lands and 
resources in ways denied to non-Sami. Falling into this category is the oldest, 
most iconic Sami territorial right, reindeer herding. As noted, the Sami ‘rein-
deer-herding right’ has been honoured in Norway for centuries. This right is 
geographically limited to the north of the country, covering about 40 per cent 
of Norway’s land mass.64 Approximately 3,000 Sami are involved in herding, 
owning some 200,000 reindeer.65 For several reasons, herding is officially out-
side the scope of authority of the Sámediggi. Instead, authority over reindeer 
herding is exercised by Norway’s Ministry of Agriculture, in collaboration with 
the Sami Reindeer Herders Association. However, over the past decade the 
Sámediggi has gained increased authority over reindeer-related matters, such 
as managing grazing-lands and reviewing development proposals that might 
impact herding.
Falling into a similar category are Sami fishing rights, instituted in 2012. In 
Finnmark as well as parts of Troms and Nordland counties, small fishing vessels 
now enjoy certain privileges, including a ‘bonus’ fishing quota and exclusive 
rights to fish in inshore waters. Traditionally these small vessels have been pre-
dominantly owned and operated by Sami. Hence, these fishing rights, unlike 
reindeer-herding rights, are targeted at, but not legally exclusive to, Sami. The 
Sámediggi, in collaboration with Norwegian authorities, plays a part in man-
aging this fishery.66
The final sort of Sami territorial authority, and certainly the sort that has 
expanded most dramatically of late, is Sami collective ownership and manage-
ment of land and resources. The first Sami victories in this regard were achieved 
through the courts. Two cases, both from 2001, are notable. In the so-called 
Svartskog case, the Norwegian High Court ruled that a predominantly Sami 
64 Wilson and Selle, supra note 38, p. 37.
65 J. Riseth, J. Åge and I. Lie, ‘Reindrifta i Finnmarks betydning for næringsutvikling og 
samfunnsutvikling’, in E. Angell, S. Eikeland and P. Selle (eds.), Nordområdene i endring. 
Urfolkspolitikk og utvikling (Gyldendal Akademisk, Oslo, 2016).
66 S. Andersen and E. Eyþórsson, ‘Kystfiskeutvalget – Drømmen som brast?’, in B. Bjerkli and 
P. Selle (eds.), Samepolitikkens utvikling, (Gyldendal Akademisk, Oslo, 2015); B. Hersoug and 
E. Mikkelsen, ‘Samisk fiske og sjøsamisk kultur – «fem på tolv» eller «fem over tolv»?’, in 
Angell et al. (eds.), supra note 65.
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community retained collective property rights to a local parcel of land despite 
claims of ownership by the state.67 Meanwhile, in Selbu, the High Court ruled 
a group of Sami reindeer herders have user rights, dating from “time immemo-
rial”, to graze their herds on local lands privately held by farmers.68 The very 
fact that these cases reached Norway’s top court underscores their high stakes, 
with Sami winning territorial rights at what some perceived to be the expense 
of the Norwegian general public.
The courts have not been the only avenue through which Norway’s Sami have 
enhanced territorial control. Such control has also been acquired through pro-
visions of Norwegian legislation. An important example is the 2009 Planning 
and Building Act, with provisions that apply in the aforementioned Sami rein-
deer-grazing area.69 Those provisions allow the Sámediggi to raise objections 
to development that might negatively impact Sami. If the Sámediggi’s concerns 
are not satisfied, development must cease until Norway’s government either 
fixes the problem or overrides the Sami objection.70 Similarly, the aforemen-
tioned 2005 consultation agreement requires the Norwegian state to consult 
the Sámediggi (and sometimes other relevant Sami groups, such as reindeer 
herders) on all government undertakings affecting Sami.71 As noted, if those 
matters relate to culture or language they apply throughout Norway. If, how-
ever, they relate to land and natural resources, the state’s duty to consult is 
geographically limited to “traditional Sami areas” – in principle, the 40 per cent 
of Norway where only Sami may herd reindeer.
But the most dramatic acquisition of Sami territorial authority was secured 
through negotiations with the Norwegian government. In 1997, Norway’s Sami 
Rights Commission concluded Norway was in breach of Sami land-and-re-
source rights guaranteed under ILO 169. Some years later, formal consultations 
between Norway’s Parliament and the Sámediggi commenced. These negotia-
tions were unprecedented: They were conducted in the manner of “nation to 
nation” diplomacy, as if between two sovereigns, much like the “modern treaty” 
negotiations now common in Anglo-settler states such as Canada. While 
67 M. Fitzmaurice, ‘The new developments regarding the Saami peoples of the North’, 
16:1 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2009) pp. 67–156; B. Bjerkli, 
‘Svartskogen – en fortelling om motstand og forsvar av rettigheter’, in G. Nilsen (ed.), 
Kulturmøter i Nord-Troms. Jubileumsbok for Nord-Troms museum 1978–2003 (Nord – Troms 
Museum, Sørkjosen, 2004).
68 Falch and Selle, supra note 50.
69 Falch and Selle, ibid.
70 Wilson and Selle, supra note 38, p. 36.
71 Allard, supra note 40.
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Norway proposed that the state and the Sami co-manage disputed lands, the 
Sami additionally insisted that certain lands be returned directly to Indigenous 
owners. Eventually the negotiations produced the 2005 Finnmark Act.
The Finnmark Act applies, as the name suggests, only in Finnmark county – 
again, the county with the greatest number of Sami. Among the institutions 
created by the act is the Finnmark Estate, or FeFo. FeFo is a co-management 
board tasked with overseeing Finnmark’s common lands – approximately 95 
per cent of the county. FeFo’s board comprises three members appointed by 
the Finnmark County Council and three by the Sámediggi (one of whom must 
represent reindeer-herding interests). On some matters, super majoritarian 
voting rules ensure Sami concerns are overweighted in the Sami heartland of 
inner Finnmark. FeFo was at first wildly controversial, with detractors labelling 
it undemocratic and mounting a petition campaign to have it quashed. FeFo’s 
actual effects have been less dramatic.72 While on one hand FeFo is mandated 
to manage Finnmark lands “in particular as a basis for Sami culture”, it also 
must be “ethnically neutral”, assigning rights and benefits to residents regard-
less of whether they are Sami, so long as doing so does not impair Sami culture.
A second institution created by the Finnmark Act is the Finnmark 
Commission. The commission is tasked with pursuing a sort of ‘land claims 
settlement’ by surveying Finnmark’s vast commons – those lands overseen by 
FeFo – and assigning ownership and/or usage rights based on “prescription 
and immemorial usage”.73 During the commission’s first decade of work it for 
the most part surveyed outer Finnmark, assigning no collective land to Sami. 
This failure to provide explicit ownership to Sami alarmed the Sámediggi, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,74 and various 
scholars,75 who suggested Norway remained in breach of ILO 169.
Recently, however, the land-tenure situation in Finnmark appears to have 
changed markedly. In late 2019 the Finnmark Commission completed its sur-
vey of the lands of the inner Finnmark municipal district of Karasjok. At over 
72 A. Spitzer and P. Selle, ‘Claims-based co-management in Norway’s Arctic? Examining Sami 
land governance as a case of treaty federalism’, 52:4 Canadian Journal of Political Science 
(2019), pp. 723–741.
73 Fitzmaurice, supra note 67; Ø. Ravna and N. Bankes, ‘Recognition of Indigenous land rights 
in Norway and Canada’, 24:1 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2017) pp. 
70–117.
74 United Nations Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples on the human rights situation of the Sami people in the Sápmi region 
of Norway, Sweden and Finland’ (2016).
75 E.g., Ø. Ravna, ‘Sami rights to natural resources and lands in Norway’, in N. Loukacheva 
(ed.), Polar Law and Resources (Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen, 2015).
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5,000 square kilometres, the Karasjok district is the second largest in Norway. 
It is also, as noted, a core Sami area, where reindeer herding is ubiquitous and 
where Sami comprise an overwhelming majority of the population. It was thus 
dramatic news when the commission declared almost all the land in Karasjok 
to belong not to the state but collectively to the local residents. Though the 
commission made little mention of the residents’ ethnicity, it in effect assigned 
the land to the Sami. Even to Sami political insiders this was a surprising and 
welcome development. If it stands,76 the decision could be fairly characterised 
as Norway’s (indeed, Europe’s) first Indigenous land-claims settlement.
The Finnmark Commission’s decision is also dramatic for what it means for 
the rest of the Sami heartland. The logic undergirding the decision suggests 
much more land will be turned over to the Sami. The commission observed 
that Karasjok had not been encompassed within Norway since “time immemo-
rial”, but rather was annexed in 1751 as part of a settlement with neighbouring 
Sweden. Since then, the commission ruled, the Norwegian state had not suffi-
ciently established itself as the rightful owner of the area. As observers of the 
decision quickly noted, the same historical facts apply to Karasjok’s even larger 
neighbour, the municipal district of Kautokeino, and to parts of the nearby 
Tana and Porsanger municipal districts as well. Hence it is now assumed the 
land in those districts, too, will be assigned to their overwhelmingly Sami 
populations. Barring reversals, this would result in Sami exercising collective 
ownership of an area of inner Finnmark exceeding 15,000 square kilometres, a 
territory larger than Montenegro or Qatar.
5 Analysis and Conclusion
It can be seen, then, that over the four decades of Sami political mobilisation 
in Norway, there has been a clear trend concerning the exercise of Indigenous 
territorial authority vis-à-vis nta.
After the Alta Conflict, when Sami shocked Norway with demands for rec-
ognition as a rights-bearing Indigenous nation, the powers they won were 
initially non-territorial. These initial Sami powers let them constitute, stand 
76 At this point it is not completely certain the Karasjok decision will stand: various entities, 
including the Norwegian state, could contest it. Also, even if the decision stands, it is 
unclear what the practical consequences may be. Decisions will likely need to be made 
concerning governance of the newly assigned land. Will it continue to be governed by 
existing land-management authorities? Will it be governed by the public government 
of Karasjok? Or will governance be assigned to some other entity, such as, perhaps, the 
Sámediggi? Achieving clear answers will likely take several years.
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for office in, and be represented by, the Sámediggi. The Sámediggi was in turn 
empowered to manage functional domains relating to the Sami language, busi-
ness development, cultural heritage, and the like.
These powers were a breakthrough in Sami self-determination. But they 
provided Sami with almost no authority over their traditional lands and 
resources. Securing such authority would have been difficult. This is in part 
because Sami are in a position common for Indigenous peoples: They have 
been overwhelmed in their homelands, minoritised by land-hungry settlers, 
rendered culturally vulnerable – and they have little desire for statelike sta-
tus. These are the sorts of reasons that led de Villiers, Klímová-Alexander and 
Nimni to prescribe nta as a means of Indigenous empowerment.
Yet as we have also shown, recent years have seen a shift. Though the early 
forms of Sami nta remain in place, Sami have lately also acquired notewor-
thy territorial authority. This newest Sami authority is not limited to cultural, 
linguistic or spiritual matters. Rather, it is authority over lands and resources.
As mentioned, territorial authority is commonly seen as involving any one 
of three powers – jurisdiction, access control, and land-and-resource manage-
ment. Sami now exercise all three. In the Sami-dominated municipal districts, 
they enjoy de facto jurisdiction (of an admittedly limited sort). They also enjoy 
privileged access to reindeer herding and certain fisheries. And, most notably, 
they have won a wide variety of rights concerning the regulation and own-
ership (or co-ownership) of their traditional lands. Save for the immemorial 
reindeer-herding right, these victories have come about in the past 15 years.
This Sami turn toward territorial authority is perhaps unsurprising. As 
noted, Sami identify as Indigenous peoples – peoples often defined by their 
distinctive economic and cosmological attachment to their lands. As also 
noted, Norway’s modern era of Sami mobilisation arose from the Alta Conflict, 
a clash in the Sami heartland pitting Sami environmental concerns and tra-
ditional land-use practices against the development objectives of the state. 
Because of the nature of this clash, and because of Sami Indigeneity, Sami 
have sought and won greater control over territory – just as scholars such as 
Nieguth, Kymlicka and Patton might have predicted. We conclude that, while 
nta has served Sami interests in Norway, it was insufficient to satisfy their dis-
tinctly Indigenous demands. Regaining control over territory has been core to 
the Sami campaign.
5.1 Further Sami Territorialisation: Opportunities and Barriers
Despite having achieved numerous territorial powers, the Sami of Norway 
have so far not consolidated these powers into anything like a comprehensive 
territorial regime. Instead, Sami powers over land-management, access to land 
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and resources, and (very limited) jurisdiction apply to various zones and/or 
resources – here and there, to this and that. Moreover, these various zones and/
or resources are not overseen by a singular Sami authority but by a variety – by 
the Sámediggi, Sami-majority municipalities such as Karasjok, the Finnmark 
Estate, the Sami Reindeer Herders Association, and so forth. As a consequence, 
Sami exercise a sort of patchwork of territorial authority. There is no specific 
‘Sami Province’ over which they comprehensively rule.
Theoretically, it is not impossible that the Sami might develop a compre-
hensive territorial regime. The apparent ‘land-claim settlement’ in Karasjok, 
especially, could provide Sami with political and geographic space in which to 
begin to develop their own semi-autonomous province. Such a province could 
be modelled on other regions of the world where Indigenes enjoy de facto or 
de jure self-rule, such as the aforementioned Nunavut Territory in Canada. 
We doubt, however, that such dramatic developments are likely. Indeed, far 
from establishing their own territorial regime, we suspect Norway’s Sami have 
begun to encounter certain barriers that will slow and perhaps halt even rel-
atively mundane territorialisation. We see three barriers as especially salient, 
relating to Norwegian and Sami demographics, Norway’s constitutional struc-
ture, and political resistance.
First, further Sami territorialisation will be complicated by demography. 
Again, Sami are a minority outside inner Finnmark. It thus seems unlikely col-
lective Sami land ownership will expand beyond inner Finnmark. Indeed, as 
noted, even Sami land co-management, currently spanning all of Finnmark, 
has been highly controversial. Meanwhile, despite 15 years of talk, Sami land 
co-management has not extended beyond Finnmark, to Nordland or Troms 
counties, which also are home to substantial Sami populations. At this point 
there is no reason to expect it will.
A second demographic factor likely to limit Sami territorialisation is urban-
isation.77 Of late, enrolment in the Sami electoral registry has grown dramati-
cally in cities outside the Sami core. This has been the case in northern cities 
like Tromsø and Alta, which in 2019 became the municipalities with the larg-
est and third-largest number of Sami enrollees. It has also been the case far 
beyond Sápmi, in Oslo, now ranked fifth in enrolment. Such urbanisation is 
likely to continue. It is also likely to reduce the share of Sami with a political 
stake in exercising territorial authority, pointing in the direction of more nta.
77 P. Selle, A. Semb and K. Strømsnes, ‘Urbanisering av det samiske elektoratet: En 
framvoksende skillelinje i den moderne samepolitikken’, Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning 
(2020) pp. 101–123.
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Adding to the aforementioned demographic complications are limits placed 
on Sami territorialisation by Norway’s constitutional structure. First, unlike 
settler-states such as the US and Canada, Norway is not a federal union of sov-
ereign polities. Rather, it is unitary. Power has historically been concentrated 
in Oslo, making it hard for most Norwegians, including many Sami, to embrace 
the notion of sub-state actors wielding comprehensive territorial authority. At 
the same time, Norway has long devolved key decision-making and adminis-
trative responsibilities to its 350 regional municipal districts, which jealously 
guard their power. Though, as noted, this tradition in effect provides Sami with 
public control in the municipal districts of inner Finnmark, it offers them 
little space within any given district to act in an explicitly ethnic dimension, 
and may hamper their collaboration across the districts of inner Finnmark. 
Moreover, beyond inner Finnmark it entrenches non-Sami authorities wary of 
ceding power to Sami.
Complicating matters more is Norway’s long, proud history as a compre-
hensive welfare state. Norwegian culture is considered ‘state friendly’. The 
role of the state is pervasive and thus universalising. There is little appe-
tite for variations from region to region in the quantity and quality of state 
services such as transportation, medical care, and education. Hence, even 
remote, traditionally Sami areas broadly accept – even demand – inclusion 
in the welfare state, often valuing political and redistributive equality over 
ethnopolitical difference.
The Sami have also encountered non-structural political barriers to 
their further territorialisation. One of these barriers is the Sami’s lack of 
revenue-generating power. Most territorial authorities, such as Norwegian 
municipal districts, Canadian provinces and even American Indian tribes, 
are empowered to raise funds by levying taxes or collecting resource reve-
nues from development. The Sámediggi enjoys no such powers. Instead, it 
relies for all its funding on the Norwegian state. This limits the Sámediggi’s 
capacity to exercise territorial authority, while also removing incentives for 
it to do so: if territorialisation incurs costs and challenges without benefits, 
why pursue it?
A final barrier to Sami territorialisation has been Norway’s denial to the 
Sámediggi of other key territorial powers. Most notable was its refusal in 
the 2010 Minerals Act to allow the Sámediggi to veto mining projects or seek 
compensation in case of harm to Sami. This refusal was denounced by the 
Sámediggi, which deemed it a violation of ILO 169. The consequences of this 
decision were amplified in 2019, when Norway approved the first new mine in 
Finnmark in a generation. The mine is vigorously opposed by the Sámediggi, 
which calls it the gravest threat to Sami culture since the Alta Conflict.
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For all these reasons, barring some unforeseen change, Sami territorialisa-
tion in Norway is unlikely to go much further than it has already. Because of 
reasons common to Indigenous nations, Sami opportunities for exercising ter-
ritorial authority are limited. At the same time, existing Sami territorial author-
ity is unlikely to retreat. In part because of the Sami’s distinctive, Indigenous 
attachment to their land, it is hardly surprising that, despite its nonterritorial 
start, Sami self-government in Norway has of late expanded beyond nta, into 
substantial territorial authority. While nta has been useful to Sami, it has 
proved insufficient. Territorial authority has been sought and, in a patchwork 
fashion, acquired – but the limits to such authority may be near.
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